11:59:59: An Artillery Battalion’s Lessons Learned from JRTC
11:59:59: An Artillery Battalion’s
Lessons Learned from JRTC
Introduction
The purpose of this white paper is to describe successes and areas of improvement for the 5th Battalion, 25thField Artillery Regiment from train up to execution of JRTC 23-09, within the context of future force design. Areas of emphasis include team building, training management, maintenance, and future force design. Each area of emphasis highlights focus points made by the command describing how the Thunder Battalion operated before and during the rotation and cover future relationships between the FA and supported MNVR BDE.
Manning
The 5th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery approached training with the understanding that teams must first be cohesive. Due to manning shortages and our geographic location as a separate brigade, we had to do more with less. PLTs were encouraged to create mascots and mottos, regular sensing sessions were conducted, the BN held team building events at echelon and batteries held dinners with families funded by Division Chaplain finances. Each day began with leaders conducting well planned out and challenging PT with their Soldiers and LTs were held to high standards. Soldiers were provided predictability in training schedules to maximize family support and readiness. Such an approach required leadership to demonstrate good faith toward the best interests of everyone assigned to the unit. The goal was to have every member of the battalion understanding their worth as a crucial member of the team and in doing so it motivated everyone to give their all during each training event. The battalion deliberately extinguished anything marginalizing or ostracizing Soldiers. Thunder Battalion had to take this deliberate approach due to difficulties stemming from manning shortfalls. We fought to maintain 18/18 guns, 6/6 FDCs, and 6/6 radars. It was tough to keep sections certified when those in key billets would ETS or PCS with limited backfills. The BN had to “grow their own,” but did so impressively, especially as the training glidepath took off in the late winter/ early Spring of 2023.
Training Management
Training began with an understanding that objectives are not aspirational, they would be met. Everything we did was through DIVARTY, which is a challenge being geographically separated. The Division Redbook was our standard and we leveraged visits from the DIVARTY Master Gunners as much as possible. LPDs were aimed at tactical leader development. Detailed planning was enforced to ensure BTRYs and PLTs prepared adequately. PLT quarterly training briefs were delivered to the BN CDR, paying dividends during TBL XII. It forced PLTs to think deeply, gave the BN CDR a means to assess PLT leadership, and verified PLTs nested within higher’s intent. The 8 step training model was executed for everything. Relationships were cultivated with the National Guard, aviation units, range control, and UAS to maximize opportunities. Not everything went as planned. Training was often revisited. We conducted TBL XII and the BN CDR decided to repeat it because the level of quality was not there. Doing so set conditions for a successful TBL XV.
The Live Fire Certification Program was deliberately placed on the calendar. TC 3-09.8 and the Redbook were continually followed. Safety exams were enforced for leaders in the FDC. PLT and BTRY leadership left their office and had a presence with the guns. TBL V was reported from the MG directly to the BN CDR. Battery commanders were exacting in TBL VI. The BN CDR was definitive in TBL XII. DIVARTY was principled in TBL XV. Talent management became more and more important as many lieutenants in the battalion either couldn’t pass the safety exam on multiple attempts and couldn’t serve on the gunline or weren’t in good enough shape physically to serve as company fire support officers. As a result, we had to shift LTs from fire support positions to the gunline to serve as fire direction officers and platoon leaders.
The inability to communicate is one of the greatest disablers of fires. Digital Training (DT) was held weekly with the entire kill chain. We linked the PF-D to the LFED, the BN FSE, BDE fires, the BN FDC, PLT FDCs and the guns. We prioritized digital fires at home but when FOs spread out in the AO, they defaulted to voice rather than digital communications. Once FISTs and FOs were no longer co-located with BN FSEs, digital systems were not used as trained. Even with a year of ardent DT, the Thunder Battalion still struggled with digital communication during rotation 23-09.
Rotation 23-09
We massed the BN regularly. We maintained firing capability for 6 PLTs into the 2nd battle period. We were survivable because we dug in, dispersed, and used camouflage. Gun sections performed occupation crew drills superbly. PLTs exercised disciplined initiative to gain and maintain firing capability even when execution did not go to plan. The TOC controlled FA operations well. The tactical operations center maintained a common operating picture not just with the BTRYs but with MNVR units as well. Targeting and counterfire operations proved to be effective against the enemy, which resulted in the destruction of enemy D30s and 2 x IL220s.
Sustainment is critical to fires. We used the BN FDO to track ammo and maintain an understanding of resupply triggers. Our BN XO was plugged into the BDE logistical system to meet the FSCOORD’s priorities. Still, ammo resupply was a challenge. We managed shortfalls within our haul capacity but did not properly forecast based on capabilities of the BSB and CSSB. We assigned an aggressive Battalion Ammo NCO for the BSB and CSSB to oversee throughput of CL V, but since the CSSB operated out of the ISB, we were not permitted to keep him there. Even with a menu for ammo, the CSSB did not understand how to manage shells, fuzes, primers, or propellants. Mismanagement of TMRs resulted in lethargic resupply. Emergency resupply and ammo caches alleviated many CL V issues.
Communications and information flow were challenging. Digital coms were usually up and we never lost anyone on fires voice. Foliage interfered with antennas, which meant we had to put the TOC on high ground and put antennas in trees. Information flow needed improvement between the BTRYs and TOC. The BN CMD net was intermittent at best. Responsiveness on JBCP was delayed. The FA BN TOC served as the BDE TAC during BDE TOC jumps. FM and JBCP nets were used by BDE, upper TI systems had a BDE staff member on them, and we often missed reports. Regardless, firing capability was never lost.
We experienced success with the CF cell. They integrated in the FA BN TOC rather than with BDE Fires. Having CF near the BN FDC enabled rapid fire mission processing times. It allowed for rapid communication and flexibility. Initially, 1/C was the CF delivery asset. Their processing times were long and we experienced target decay. So, 1/A became the CF shooter. With HE RAP, they were able to reach far, they gave quick response times, and they were able to destroy enemy D30s on several occasions. Q53 emplacement enabled for coverage of over 90% of the AO. When D30s decreased their displacement time, the CF cell and BN FDC used targeting to identify patterns, to anticipate where they would fire from, to develop priority targets, to lay on priority targets, and to fired immediately upon acquisition. We gained a CF advantage early when we destroyed the enemy’s IL220s. Heavy weapons PLTs secured the Q53s. They destroyed red air and enemy small arms many times.
We needed to improve the way that we employed BN FSEs. Target and observer refinement was delayed or did not occur and so dynamic targeting was inaccurate. FOs could not figure out how to gain appropriate line of sight to facilitate appropriate triggers. FOs did not arrive in time to observe BDE targets. UAS shouldn’t be the default observer, BN FSEs should. BN FSEs relied on mortars. BN FSE technical and tactical rehearsals were not conducted. The battle moved so rapidly that plans shifted, and BN FSEs relied almost entirely on dynamic targeting even when fires were planned and rehearsed.
Future Force Design
In the coming years, with an emphasis on LSCO, reorganization of FA BNs from the BCT back to the DIVARTY will require a shift to relook at the relationships between the FA community and the supported MNVR BDEs. To maintain strong relationships, fire supporters should embed with the MNVR battle rhythm. FISTers should do PT with their MNVR counterparts at least three times a week. FA BN CDRs, BDE FSOs and FA S3s should attend BCT Training Meetings and QTBs. BN FSO’s should attend MNVR BN Training Meetings. FISTers should support both MNVR training exercises as well as FA BN gunnery tables. FISTers will have to find a balance between the FA and the MNVR. BCT FSOs, FA BN S3s, DIVARTY S3s, and BCT S3s must be in regular communication with each other. Clear lines of tasking authority should be established. DIVARTY and BCT HQs must be clear on what tasks they can place on FISTers and when. FA leaders should attend the St. Barbara’s Ball, the MNVR Ball, officer/NCO calls, LPDs, and any other social and professional events hosted by the BCT.
Even though 5-25 will fall under the Light Infantry Brigade Combat Team, we will maintain our relationship with DIVARTY for manning, training and equipping standardization. The DIVARTY CDR and CSM provide oversight and leader development. It is imperative that as the DIVARTY becomes more involved in the live fire certification program, we don’t lose quality in training with regards to maneuver. Collective training such as walk and shoots and FSCXs build on the relationship and are the best way to ensure proper integration, especially before a CTC rotation. Senior level expertise from DIVARTY will aide in bolstering emerging technology such as UAS integration, loitering munitions, cUAS, and standardizing how each FA battalion should perform with their direct support maneuver brigade.
Conclusion
This paper provided lessons learned from the Thunder Battalion as it trained for and executed a JRTC rotation, and on how the FA and MNVR relationship will be effected by future force design. Team building, training management, certification, manning, and the operations process should be deliberate to maximize fire power. As FA BNs organize under DIVARTY, they must keep strong connections with their supported unit to maximize integration. As an Army, we can’t win in LSCO without the proper integration of fires and maneuver.