Front exercises. The Mission Partner Environment is a NATO SECRET RELEASABLE upper TI network. ASCA requires appropriate system classification aligned with the network classification requirements across multinational formations and allows for
using national federated mission networks. Authorization is required for all nations/units to operate on the federated mission network (FMN) or have an approved cross-domain solution to federate onto the network. Key to network federation is physical network validation at the final planning conference (FPC) and a published Join, Maintain and Exit Instructions (JMEI).
between nations.
•A best practice is to require all nations’ fire control systems physically connect to the NATO releasable network during the FPC and conduct ASCA 040 testing. ASCA 040 testing consists of nine messaging tests incorporating the entire fire architecture to
validate ASCA messaging. To accomplish this task, join, maintain and exit instructions, the network manager must publish JMEI before the FPC. All participating nations must meet the classification and system federation requirements to join or be hosted on the network.
•Extend ASCA University to a six-day model that encompasses training (U.S. only), testing and validation of the database and data distribution, culminating in a digital fire support validation exercise executed by the unit. All participants will execute ASCA University with the assigned IP and NATO Alias on a closed network, open IP switch. At the end state, all units connect to the live NATO releasable FMN network and are ready to execute operations immediately.
Discussion Points
• Technical competence, lack of emphasis on digital sustainment training and pre- operation network federation have degraded the interoperability and functionality of the ASCA interface across the Fires warfighting function. This degradation across the
technical domain resulted in an overreliance on the human and procedural domains
to execute multination fire missions. Additionally, systemic training shortfalls in fire direction and establishing a fires communication PACE plan with issued equipment further stressed the procedural and technical interoperability domains inside the digital kill chain, increasing fire mission processing times.
• Digital fire control system classification requirements and operating parameters vary by ASCA nation. Most fire control systems of ASCA nations are classified as “restrictive” based on national classification requirements when conducting live fire. Increasing the classification to “secret” presents additional information security barriers for these countries requiring additional clearances and associated manning concerns to operate these fire control systems at higher system classification. This results in ASCA nations resorting to cross-domain solutions to transfer ASCA messages across the different security classifications if the nation has developed and fielded a cross-domain solution and, worst case resorting to a ‘swivel chair’ between systems.
• During Dynamic Front, the Italian Liaison Officer (LNO) team employed their tactical fire direction system, Sistema Informatico di Reggimento di Artiglieria (SIR), as an unclassified system and were unable to adjust their classification without additional
resources and approval. This system was not approved on the Authorization to
Operate (ATO) memorandum provided by U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF), preventing them from connecting to any live network outside ASCA University. The inability to connect to the network forced the liaison officer (LNO) to execute
‘swivel chair’ mission processing for all fire missions, significantly increasing the overall processing time. A cross-domain solution through the German ASCA gateway could provide a cross-domain solution to address this issue; however, the decision to change the task organization of the Italian Field Artillery battalion never occurred.
• Currently, two versions of the ASCA software are in use, version 7.02 and version 5.4.1.1. These versions are not backward compatible, requiring commanders to utilize the lowest common denominator across the task organization. Few member nations have
currently fielded version 7.02. Great Britain (GBR) employs the Fire Control Battlefield Information System Application (FC BISA) with separate ASCA version interfaces that cannot currently communicate. The ARRC and MN FAB operated on FC BISA 4.0, capable of executing ASCA V5.4.1.1, while the 26th RA and 1st RHA operated on FC BISA 4.2, capable of executing ASCA V7.02. Unfortunately, these two versions cannot communicate, requiring a ‘swivel chair’ to transfer firing data between the MN FAB to
the GBR BNs, increasing processing time.
• Tactical Communications Information System (TACCIS) (UK SECRET) network facilitated C2 and fire direction communication between the ARRC to
the MN FAB while the Mission Partner Environment (MPE) (U.S. NATO SECRET)
network provided connectivity from the ARRC, through the 41st Field Artillery Brigade (FAB) LNO team, to the 41st FAB. This resulted in confusion, information loss and increased mission processing times. A cross-domain solution was not established
between these two networks, resulting in a break in digital communications. This
network design invalidated all network testing completed during ASCA University
since ASCA University was executed on a closed network with an open IP switch.
• ASCA University focused on understanding interoperability across the ASCA community and participating training audience. The key objectives of ASCA University were to validate the existing databases, distribute data between fire control systems, execute ASCA 40 testing procedures and limit technical dilemmas or disruptions across
ASCA data distribution in a controlled, closed-network environment.
• Integration of Fort Sill ASCA subject matter experts (SME) before the
execution of training is highly recommended to ensure teaching and testing procedures comply with the most up-to-date information and system
capabilities. Additional integration of these individuals in the planning process
did not occur and resulted in avoidable friction before the execution of ASCA University and Dynamic Front 22.
• Database development and validation must remain consistent with the NATO
STANAGs and AARTYP-1. The 56th Artillery Command, with assistance from the theater ASCA Lead and Fort Sill ASCA SME, must validate the database before publishing. Initially, the database had incorrect Unit Reference Numbers (URN) and NATO Aliases. This resulted in a directed database reconstruction during ASCA University, requiring revalidation before the dry and live fire. We recommend a standing exercise database across all NATO field artillery exercises.
Conclusion.
The Dynamic Front exercise series continues to grow in complexity each year. The ability for Allies and Partners to continually progress along the three domains of field artillery interoperability must extend beyond the execution of ASCA University and the Dynamic Front exercise dates. Each year, incremental increases in technical, procedural and human fires competencies were shown during the exercise. As units prepare for Dynamic Front, the expectation is that the lessons observed and identified are trained and improved so the European Fires Enterprise can continue to advance rapidly in
delivering lethal fires.
MAJ Karl B. Kunkleman is the Senior Fire Direction Trainer for the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). He is a 10-year Army Field Artillery officer who has over five years of multinational experience with two NATO deployments (Estonia, Latvia). His previous assignments include 1st Armored Division and 2nd Cavalry Regiment. For the past two years he has held positions as Battery OC/T and Senior Fire Direction Trainer completing over 12 Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) rotations. In addition, he has attended over six exercises and three conferences focused on multinational unit and systems integration.
Disclaimer: CALL presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede
any information in other official U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material they provide.