Innovation and Experimentation

Innovation and Experimentation

Reversing Negative Fire Support Trends at the National Training Center

By: LTC Erick Buckner, LTC Justin Cuff, CW2 Kory Engdall, and COL(R) Kevin Batule

For centuries it has been said that necessity is the mother of invention. Modern interpretations of this old proverb have been expressed in many ways, but the essence of the message behind it is that when you really need a change, innovation will eventually bring about one. Simply put, a need stimulates experimentation which eventually yields a solution. Perhaps nowhere could this be more applicable than when confronting the challenge of reversing longstanding negative fire support trends in the Army’s Combat Training Centers. The necessity is obvious, and the trends have been stubbornly similar for decades now. 

The Army training model and feedback mechanism that we call the After-Action Review (AAR) is a sacred, time-tested model which allows unit leaders to discuss what was supposed to happen, review what DID happen, and then examine what can be done better. It is a model which emphasizes the close examination of problems to see where we went awry, and then addresses ways to fix these mistakes. Fire support AARs at NTC for some thirty to forty years follow a strikingly similar pattern in that there is a consistent repetition of the same negative themes. But, merely emphasizing what went wrong isn’t exactly helping improve fire support performance, necessarily. Modern research about human performance reveals that this approach is faulty and asserts that repeating the things we do well can generate faster, longer lasting performance improvement.

This article is not about arguing the merits of either approach. The focus of this essay is on sharing recent innovative techniques and practices that are effectively reversing longstanding negative trends. We’ll just call them experiments, or in even plainer terms they are innovative attempts at a new technique to find out if it works better. When they work better, it only makes sense to try and repeat them, and then share them. The big idea behind doing this is that we can share what is working well, and in sharing the successful technique we can help promote improved performance across the fire support enterprise in the Army’s Brigade Combat Team formations. It is in this spirit that our essay is presented, with the hopes that repeated performance of things that are working right will generate improvement. The evidence and information presented by the authors of this article is based on two recent rotations at the National Training Center in FY 24, and the opinions and assertions in the essay belong to the authors exclusively. They do no

t represent an official view of the Field Artillery School or the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, or even the Department of the Army. Using practices attempted at the National Training Center during rotations NTC 24-04 and NTC 24-09, we will share evidence of successful innovations that are helping to reverse longstanding negative fire support trends (see figure 1). So, as we gathered insights from leaders in both the First Armored Division and Third Infantry Division from their recent NTC rotations, our attention was laser-focused on techniques which helped reverse the negative fire support trends.  

Ready First Brigade Uses Innovative Techniques w/ MSS, Counter-battery fires and Observers in NTC 24-04

With new challenges come new opportunities, and those new opportunities can help drive change. As units train to fight in Large Scale Combat Operations, doing what we’ve always done may not be the answer if it isn’t going to guarantee successful integration of fire support for the Brigade Combat Team. 2^nd Battalion, 3^rd Field Artillery Regiment (2-3FA) tested and validated a unique mission set this past February which yielded some rather successful fire support innovations during NTC 24-04. 1^st Armored Division challenged the Ready First Combat Team to plan, prepare, and execute operations without Upper TI at the brigade and battalion command posts. A first time use for a unit at the National Training Center, the Ready First Brigade employed a Mission Support Site (MSS) in sanctuary at Santa Fe while the Main Command Post (MCP) was forward deployed in the box. 

During the rotation the Ready First Brigade and 2-3 FA used this challenge as an opportunity to try three innovative new techniques: 1) A Robust MSS for Targeting 2) A Quickfire Counterfire lash-up and 3) A Risk Estimate Diagram to improve Observation Planning. 

Mission Support Site (MSS) Implementation 

Implementing the MSS (see figure 2) placed a huge demand signal on manning because it meant that the brigade would operate two distinct command posts simultaneously, and this challenge also forced the brigade to carefully evaluate the roles and responsibilities of each of these two nodes. At first the idea was that the MSS would operate as outlined in ATP 2-19.4 (Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques), which defines its role as “collaborating and disseminating information, intelligence products, and analytical conclusions with the rest of the BCT intelligence cell elements and higher headquarters.” With the constraint of no Upper TI at the MCP, it quickly evolved into much more than this. Importantly, this would be the only node with Upper TI to push and pull digital products to and from the 52ID. Consequently, more warfighting functions were needed at this site to operate effectively.    

The MSS was manned primarily with personnel from the Brigade Intelligence Support Element (BISE), augmented by FSE, ADAM/BAE, JTACs, ISRLO, SWO, JAG, and PSYOPS. In the beginning, the communications were completely reliant upon JBC-P / IJBC-P chat rooms and SMDLs to send products back and forth. Understanding this, the BDE set up a JBC-P academics training period to establish a standard method for product dissemination and chat room functionality. By doing this the BDE set conditions for continuous improvement and eventually established integrated tactical network (ITN) and joint network node (JNN) with 52ID, as well as HF, FM, & SATCOM which grew in functionality throughout the rotation. These were provided by different staff sections and throughout the duration of NTC were slowly implemented between the MSS and MCP.  Not only did the MSS have the ability to communicate to the critical fires capabilities resident with the 52ID, it was given the authority to employ them. The essential ingredient to success of the MSS was the Decision Authority Matrix approved by the BDE CDR. Given only intermittent comms with the MCP, it was necessary to allow the Field Artillery Intelligence Officers (FAIOs) to assume the same responsibilities as the BDE FSO.  Specifically, this meant dynamic Re-tasking of CAS, ISR, and employment of Grey Eagle Hellfire missiles. Doing this ensured that no sortie went home still loaded with ordnance and it proved to be instrumental in the shaping of the deep fight. The BISE team also had a more accurate SITTEMP of the enemy than the MCP because it collected and consolidated HUMINT, SIGNINT/ELINT, OSINT, IC, Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, and other sources of information the BISE can collect. This resulted in a more aggressive approach with a more complete picture of the targeting process.

Another capability that was a huge contributor to the MSS was our Airforce counterparts - the JTACs and ISRLO. Both brought a level of competence, expertise, and equipment to attack targets both in the close and deep. They operated alongside the GEOINT cell to resource the exploitation of FMV, GMTI, Airborne and satellite imagery. As well as, provided HF and SATCOM capabilities back to the MCP during times when comms was degraded. The ISRLO was well versed in coordinating sensor tasking of Army and Airforce platforms while performing ISR Tactical Control with multiple assets flying. In conjunction with this, utilizing the Decision Authority Matrix, FAIO’s had the authority to allow dynamic employment of Grey Eagle Hellfire utilizing the JTAC’s.

Counter-battery Quickfire Net

Field Artillerymen who have prepared for and fought at NTC understand the inherent challenges in

 the counterfire fight. Traditional linkage of the counter-battery chain in the BCT involves a complex and circuitous routing from radar to brigade to a controlling Headquarters, and then ultimately to a shooter. Frankly, this takes an excessive amount of time to process. As the Ready Brigade FSCOORD, the 2-3FA’s CDRs intent was to eliminate redundancy in the sensor to shooter chain and decentralize the AN/TPQ-53, CF section (located at the MCP), and Charlie Battery for expedient fires (see Figure 3). At first a seemingly daunting task, it required teaching and training the battery commander, fire direction officers and NCOs how to understand and manage the language required to prosecute the CF fight. Terms like “point of origin,” “air clearance,” and “handover to the MSS” were completely foreign to most of these personnel.

Once the fundamentals were clearly defined, it was time to exercise them. The brigade conducted numerous training exercises to master their craft, including CPX I-III, Table XVIII and LTP 24-04. Although the digital architecture between the nodes was intermittent and gave us trouble throughout NTC, the voice missions straight from a radar to a designated CF battery by reducing the traditional intervention points still proved to be a huge improvement in response time. The brigade also took advantage of the JBC-P linkage to pass acquisitions in the deep fight directly to the MSS when the MCP was displacing.

Another key role in the success of our CF was the GEOINT section at BDE. Utilizing what they called, “the science project” (see article in a previous journal article by CPT Jason E Martos called “Probable Position Areas for Enemy Artillery”) the brigade CF cell analyzed the terrain based on slope, hydrology, lines of communication, intervening crests, and MSRs in ArcGIS to identify where enemy forces would place their artillery. This allowed them to accurately locate PAAs the enemy would use and plan to attack them using more accurately developed zones. Zone refinement and management is crucial in the prioritization of fire mission processing. The goal was to have six active zones simultaneously, two CFZs and 4 CFFZs that mirrored the threat and scheme of maneuver. The FAIOs in the MSS were able to construct a heat map based on “the science project” analyze the CFO’s zones and provide recommendations for adjustments to them.

Observation Planning 

A successful fire support plan integrated into the targeting process (D3A) needs a solid observation plan, understood at the lowest level. ATP 3-09.42 (Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team) states “Observer positioning needs to be top driven with a requirement to provide detailed refinement in order to ensure effective target attack.” And this is exactly what was expected of the BDE FSE. Understanding the 6-step technique, BDE FSE conducted initial observation planning synchronized in the Target Working Group. Once complete those grids were sent back to the MSS for further analysis. At the MSS, the FAIOs along with the GEOINT team utilized ArcGIS to plot the targets and initial OBS locations. Then implementing the Risk Estimate Diagram (RED) (shown at Figure 4) and line of sight analysis the fire support enterprise could look at the suitability/feasibility of each OP and provide refinements back to the MCP. 

The MCP would then codify the refinements, re-align primary and alternate OBS, and capture it in the Annex D for maneuver battalions to provide bottom-up refinement. It was critical for the BN/CO FSOs to understand the OPs provided were general locations and the FO’s once on ground had leeway to occupy anywhere in the general location. Following the publishing of Annex D, the IC and Fires rehearsal would begin. FSOs will talk their scheme of maneuver, TTLODAC, and announce triggers for their targets as well as OBS plan as they proceed. Immediately following the IC and Fires every FSO had 2hrs to provide target refinements before heading into the Fires Technical rehearsal. Enforcing the target refinement cutoff was extremely helpful to ensure all products were finalized before the technical rehearsal began.

First Brigade, Third Infantry Division Fire Support Success Built on Innovative Use of Starlink and Hawkeye in NTC 24-04 

Perhaps no combat arm so heavily relies on the ability to communicate to perform its basic function as does the Field Artillery. Take a disciplined and well-trained infantry company, for example.  If you remove its ability to communicate but provide it with intent, it has a reasonable chance of accomplishing its mission. For the Field Artillery, this becomes a more difficult proposition. Since the rapid successes of German armored formations in the Second World War, armored formations have relied and continued to rely upon tactical FM radios to communicate. In today’s U.S. Army, the SINGCARS RT-1523 with its ancillary equipment remains the tactical workhorse of the artillery across the kill-chain for both voice and digital communications. 

As a result of our continued reliance on the RT-1523, BCTs at our CTCs continue to struggle with maintaining digital communications and executing digital fire missions. It is time to end our dependence on the RT-1523 and FM communications for digital fire mission connectivity. During NTC 24-09 1^st Brigade Combat Team, 3^rdInfantry Division employed Starlink and Hawkeye systems at critical nodes which provided reliable Tactical Internet Capability to the BCT’s kill chain, resulting in a record amount of missions fired at a higher level of effectiveness than normally produced at the National Training Center!. This accomplishment is a profound reversal of the trend # 6 stated during the introduction about digital communications struggles. Based on this convincing data from the innovative Marne Division experiment, the argument that each battalion and higher fires node within a BCT’s fires enterprise must have its own dedicated Upper-TI capability is not only a sound one, but it is an absolute imperative! Ensuring a resilient, reliable, and efficient digital kill-chain is a key ingredient for timely and consistent execution of effective fires.  

A preponderance of the difficulties with FM digital communications occur within the fire support half of a BCT’s kill chain, unnecessarily delaying and slowing the linkage from the fire support half to the field artillery half.[1]  How does this play out?  Take a BCT on the offense, for example. Combined Arms Battalions (CAB) receive their missions and determine where they must establish their command posts to provide adequate command and control of their formations while maintaining communications with the BCT.  This often necessitates forward positioning of their command posts and mobile command groups, which inevitably include their battalion fire support officers. As a result of this forward positioning, battalion fire support elements are frequently positioned out of range to pass fire missions digitally over tactical FM radios to either the brigade Fire Support Element (FSE)or FA battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC). The BCT may have a plan to mitigate this risk using its organic retrans assets, but this quickly falls apart due to maintenance challenges, enemy action, or several other possibilities. Consequently, the lack of digital communications now necessitates voice or JBCP missions from all four battalion/squadron fire support elements to the BCT’s fire support element, resulting in a clogging of the voice communications net, easily overwhelming the Brigade’s FSE. This causes friction and the inability to handle large volumes of fire missions in a timely manner at the BCT’s FSE.  BCT FSE personnel must input each fire mission manually into AFATDS and send to the FA BN or to Division for prosecution – if they even have digital communications with those echelons.  In the middle of handling six different missions, digital communications with the battalion FDC is lost and troubleshooting must occur. Fire missions which are stacked upon each other now take more than 30 minutes to process and complete. In some cases, the target attack is never completed.                 

During NTC 24-09, the 1-41 FA battalion FDC, equipped with the Hawkeye maintained reliable Upper-TI digital fire mission capability with the BCT FSE, which was equipped with Starlink.(both commercial VSAT antennas shown in figure 5) The reconnaissance squadron’s FSE maintained digital firing capability using Starlink, and was able to communicate directly with both the BCT FSE and FA BN FDC. The MSS, also fielded with Starlink, maintained communication with all of the above. Maintaining Upper-TI digital fire mission capability between these nodes enabled a reliable digital kill chain.  They were able to maintain communications without the need to continually troubleshoot the lack of digital FM communications, enabling the crews to focus on the execution of fire missions. Receiving and sending fire missions digitally as opposed to voice enabled a far more rapid execution of fires, as the operators were now able to send and receive using clicks instead of reading back voice commands.  The rapid execution of fires resulted in a higher effectiveness rate normally seen, as less time passed between when the fire missions were called by observers to when rounds impacted their intended targets. The rapid execution of fire missions enabled a far higher volume of fires, clearing out fire mission ques quickly at each node.  The level of bandwidth brought to the table by these systems enabled the BCT FSE and BN FDC to perform far better FSCM management, resulting in more accurate databases throughout the kill-chain.  

Conclusions and Thoughts for the Future

Innovation and experimentation by leaders in National Training Center rotations 24-04 and 24-09 paved the way for enormous success, reversing at least four of the eight stubborn trends which we presented in the introduction. Let’s look at what they did specifically:

1. 1. Use of a well-resourced MSS with authority to attack targets enabled the Ready First Brigade to rapidly integrate maneuver, fires and intelligence and execute fires that set timely conditions for current operations.
   2. Innovative use of GEOINT analysis and application of a quickfire link reduced response times and enabled a much more responsive counterfire fight.
   3. Use of GEOINT products and a Risk Estimate Diagram improved observer planning and location accuracy, resulting in a more accurate sensor to shooter link.
   4. Experimentation by First Brigade Third Infantry Division’s Fire Support Enterprise with VSAT systems produced a consistent digital kill chain with record success and a much more effective fires than normally demonstrated at NTC.  

The above achievements are significant and certainly a positive sign. They also point to two slightly more significant takeaways: 

1. Upper TI is a Must.  Our command posts in the BCT digital kill chain need to be fielded with a dedicated upper TI capability and necessary bandwidth to handle large volumes of fires and continuous database management. We in the Field Artillery community must continue fighting for the Army to field BCTs and DIVARTYs with this capability, to include the fire support elements supporting combined arms battalions. This far more survivable, resilient to jamming, reliable, and efficient means of passing digital fire missions will enable Field Artillery assets to truly provide timely and accurate fire support.

2. Sharing What Works. Leaders from 2-3 FA and 1-41 FA conducted several numerous lesson-sharing exchanges about what worked well in their training. Not only does it speak volumes about the drive, intellect and insights of the leadership in these Field Artillery organizations, it is also proof positive that repeating the things we do well can generate performance improvement!